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Introduction
Our paper intends to examine whether multistage principal-agent relationships are explaining the different risk-taking behavior of German banks in the course of the financial crisis from 2007 to 2008. Within this context, it appears reasonable to distinguish between banks with dispersed shareholders and banks with a high ownership concentration. 3 The classical principal-agent theory assumes that managers pursue different objectives and show different risk-taking attitudes than firms' owners. Amihud and Levy (1981) or Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992) , for example, argue that managers generally avoid risk-taking due to career concerns.
Accordingly, managers show a more averse risk-taking behavior than firms` owners, because they are not able to diversify their unemployment risk.
By contrast to managers, dispersed shareholders have larger incentives to behave riskneutral (Jensen and Meckling [1976] , Demsetz and Lehn [1985] , Esty [1998] ), because they are capable to diversify their risk by engaging in a large number of projects. Furthermore, dispersed shareholders obtain lower incentives to control managers because they have to share the benefits of controlling activities with other shareholders irrespective of their capability to control. Thus, large shareholders are able to overcome this incentive problem, and therefore attain a higher chance to prevent low risk-taking by managers (Morck et al. [2005] , Stultz [2005] ). Our paper contributes to this discussion by modelling the theoretical background of principal-agent problems in the banking industry taking into account the probability of their occurrence depending on different types of banks. Moreover, our study offers empirical evidence of a distinguishable risk-taking behavior of German banks that relates to the ownership structure and monitoring capabilities of different banking sectors.
Taking into account the ambiguous effects of the shareholder structure on risk-taking behavior of banks as considered by Stultz (2005) , , and Barry et al. (2011) a number of recent studies are clearly distinguishing between shareholder concentration and shareholder rights to explain the influences of the shareholder structure on risk-taking attitudes of bank managers. Gropp and Köhler (2010) have reported that shareholders prefer more risk compared to managers irrespective of whether using shareholder rights or ownership concentration as a measurement of owner control. Moreover, Gropp and Köhler argue that bank managers generally prefer a less exposure to risk compared to owners, whether dispersed or not. Thus, their hypothesis is contradictory to some policy reports assuming that extremely generous performance based compensations obtained by poor controlled bank managers are leading to extremely risk-taking by bank managers (Kirkpatrick [2009] ). Laeven and Levine (2009) also underscore that the relationship between banks' risks and capital regulation depends critically on the ownership structure of a bank and therefore have important policy implications. 4 In general terms, these authors offer empirical evidence that risk-taking by banks positively correlates with the comparative power of shareholders.
This hypothesis coincides with the results provided by Saunders et al. (1990) suggesting that owner-controlled banks enter into higher risks than banks controlled by managers with small shareholdings. Furthermore, provide evidence that larger privately held banks move closer to insolvency than the smaller peers, but face lower distress probability.
Moreover, Beck et al. show that within the German banking industry, privately owned banks are less stable than savings banks or cooperatives whereas they describe savings banks as reporting greater distances-to-default than cooperatives. This view is consistent with Fonteyne (2007) who highlight that cooperative banks in Europe are engaging in less risky activities than commercial banks (see also Cihák and Hesse [2007] ). Barry et al. (2009) have found some contradictory results by comparing five categories of shareholders that are managers/directors, institutional investors, non-financial companies, individuals/families, and banks. Barry et al. demonstrate that the ownership structure is evidently explaining differences in risk exposures of privately owned banks. Accordingly, high equity stakes held by individuals/families or banking institutions correlate with a decrease in asset risk and default risk. These findings confirm results published by Iannotta et al. (2007) who demonstrate that a higher ownership concentration is associated with better loan quality, lower asset risk, and lower insolvency risk. 5 De Nicolò and Loukoianova (2007) indicate that due to the country and firm specific characteristics the risk exposure of foreign banks appears significantly higher than that reported for private domestic banks. Nevertheless, De Nicolò and Loukoianova are not able to maintain their findings in the case of state-owned banks and private domestic banks. In addition, the authors verify that private domestic banks enter to more risk than state-owned or foreign banks due to the larger market share of stateowned or foreign banks. By contrast, Barry et al. (2009) have not been able to find a significant relationship between ownership structure and risk-taking attitudes in the category of public banks. Moreover, they do not report a significant difference between publicly held and privately owned banks while Berger et al. (2005) demonstrate state-owned banks 4 Leaven and Levine (2009) argue that owners might compensate for the loss of utility from capital requirements by selecting riskier investment strategies. Thus, it seems likely that stricter capital regulations and banking regulation correlate with greater risk when the bank has a sufficiently powerful owner. 5 Iannotta et al. (2007) have found some empirical evidence that public sector banks have poorer loan quality and higher insolvency risk than other banks. Furthermore, their results indicate that mutual banks (saving banks and cooperatives) rely on better loan quality and lower asset risk than both private and public sector banks.
reporting poorer loan quality and higher default risk than privately owned banks. Another strain of papers also differentiate between categories of risks by showing that mutual banks enter to lower asset risk and lower default risk than government owned banks (Fraser and Zardkoohi [1996] , Hansmann [1996] ), Esty [1997] , and Iannotta et al. [2007] ). Finally, Kwan (2004) illustrates that the exposure to risk of publicly held and privately owned banks are statistically indistinguishable when considering US bank holding companies. This is consistent with Altunbas et al. (2001) who indicate only a low significance of their findings in the German banking system that privately owned banks are operating their business more efficiently than mutual and publicly held banks. Furthermore, Beltratti and Stultz (2009) have studied the influence of bank-level governance, country-level governance, country-level regulation, and banks' balance sheet and profitability characteristics on banks'
performance in the course of the financial crisis from 2007 to 2008. In accordance with the ownership structure of banks, Beltratti and Stultz underline that there is no consistent evidence that better governance lead to better performance during the crisis, but have found strong evidence that those banks with more shareholder-friendly boards perform worse.
A considerable amount of research works indicates a significant relationship between ownership concentration and risk-taking. Nevertheless, there is apparently no consensus whether this relationship is positive or negative (Iannotta et al. [2007] , Barry et al. [2009] ).
These ambiguous results in recent literature may be occurring because besides the ownership concentration a number of further conditions are also determining the risk-taking attitudes of bank managers and bank owners. These are, for instance, the role of banking regulation (Macey and O`Hara [2003] , Levine [2004] , Laeven and Levine [2009] ), deposit insurance (Prowse [1997] , Beck and Laeven [2008] ), or the globalization of the banking industry (Pathan [2009] ). Furthermore, bank market concentration (Boyd and De Nicoló [2005] , De Nicolò and Loukoianova [2007] ), stock ownership programs, and annual compensation schemes for bank managers (Erkens et al. [2009] , Bebchuk and Spamann [2010] ), and the strength of bank boards (Sullivan and Spong [2007] ) seem to relate to banks' risk-taking attitudes. Moreover, general macroeconomic circumstances appear to influence the risk-taking behavior of banks.
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In this study, we intend to prove our hypothesis that it depends on the relevance of principal-agent problems whether a bank is willing to enter to substantial risks or not.
6 Erkens et al. (2009) have shown that banks applying CEO compensation contracts with heavier emphasis on annual bonuses were faced larger losses during the financial crisis from 2007 to 2009. Bebchuk and Spamann (2010) suggest using regulation of banks' executive pay as an important element of financial regulation because they show a significant relationship between banks' executive pay and risk-taking behavior of banks' executives. In section 2, following, we will start outlining the theoretical background to gain ideas whether it is possible that bank managers deviate from the expected return to risk relation that bank owners prefer. Section 3 will summarize the data with a focus on explaining the different ownership structures of German banks. Section 4 will compile the results and assess those results within the scope of our proposed hypothesis. The paper will close with section 5
with a summary and a conclusion of our findings.
Theoretical Backgrounds
As pointed out before, the basic hypothesis of our paper is grounded on the assumption that the default probability of a bank measured by the distance-to-default depends on the bank's ownership structure and corresponding property rights structure. Accordingly, we will argue, that in the case of decreasing influence of bank owners on the behavior of the bank's employees, the occurrence of principal-agent problems is more likely.
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The basic principal-agent theory (see for example Cullis and Jones [2009], pp. 255-6) applied to the organizational structure of a bank suggests that the principal (bank owner) P mandates an employee as his agent A to do bank operations. The agent A is free how to do these operations, but has to accept given restrictions. In the case of banks, agents have to choose a portfolio that consists of more or less risky assets. Thus, the behavior of A is influencing principal's profit ‫ݎ‪൫‬ܧ‬ ൯. If the agent is using more effort e in her operations, she has to bear higher costs whereas from the principal's viewpoint executing more effort by the agent is a neutral good. If the agent's effort is generally not observable or it is costly for the principal to monitor the agent, the principal (bank owner) has to use incentives to encourage the agent selecting the owner's optimal portfolio.
We will use a commonly accepted utility function to illustrate the relationship between risk aversion of the agent and her risk-taking behavior that may depend on incentives paid by a risk neutral principal
whereas F characterizes the agent's risk aversion factor (for further information see Sharpe [2007] .) In the case of risk-neutral agents, F=0. Larger values for F are reflecting higher degrees of risk aversion. The agent's optimal portfolio is the one that provides the highest utility for the agent. This portfolio will be at the tangent of the respective indifference curve and the efficient frontier (Markowitz [1952] Risk attitudes of bank owners may also relate to multistage principal-agent relationships. If we presume a sole owner, she is free to choose her combination of risk and expected return depending on her preferences, point B in figure 1 may be optimal. Principals of bank managers are typically the 'boards of banks'. Highly profit-oriented capital markets frequently force the boards of banks mandated by their shareholders to seek point C in figure   1 . In the case of state owned banks, the principals (politicians) may also be looking for above average returns to finance public expenses outside of public budgets so that we suppose bank owners choosing Point C as well. Moreover, often the owner of a bank is simultaneously operating as the agent on behalf of another private firm (e.g. International bank holdings or insurance companies), the citizens of a region (local communities), or the cooperative members of the bank (cooperatives) so that we frequently observe multistage principal-agent relationships. Due to these more complex ownership structures, the preferred combination of risk and expected return is tied to an increasing relevance of the principal-agent problems.
All the above conditions explain why from the bank owner's viewpoint the selection of optimal portfolios of risky assets will be most unlikely with the emergence of multistage principal-agent relationships because higher information asymmetries between bank owners and bank managers are additionally increasing the probability of principal-agents problems. As stated out before, because of such uncertainties and information asymmetries we propose a (significantly) higher probability of a firm-specific financial crisis that is measured, for instance, by distances-to-default. Moreover, the probability of default is depending on the degree of pressure on bank managers exerted by bank owners to seek higher returns.
Data and assessment of different ownership structures
The Bankscope Database has provided the data, on which this study is based, for the period observations have entered our sample only if we get the complete information on 'return-onassets', 'common equity' and 'total assets' for the corresponding year of examination. After eliminating discarded data sets our final sample covers 3,194 annual observations.
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In order to prepare the ground for our study we are first of all showing a number of descriptive statistics. Furthermore, we shall apply a number of least square regressions on the so-called z-score (distance-to-default) described, for example, in Boyd and Graham's seminal 11 Bankscope database, Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing paper of 1986 as an appropriate measure of a bank's probability of default. The distances-todefault (DD) will be calculated from the 'return-on-assets' (ROA), the ratio of 'common equity' to 'total assets' (CAR) and the standard deviation of 'return-on-assets' (σROA):
and ‫ܴܣܥ‬ = ௨௧௬ ௧௧ ௦௦௧௦
. Thus, the somewhat intuitive z-score estimates the number of standard deviations the annual return-on-assets figures could fall, before the common equity of a bank turns negative.
We will compute this risk figure grounded on the standard deviation ሺߪܴܱ‫ܣ‬ሻ of each corresponding banking sector (see Table 13 ). Besides the higher validity of these distances-todefault, a further advantage of computing sector specific standard deviations of the return on assets is the comparability of banks that are reporting similar business objectives.
In the section, following, we will use three commonly influencing factors of the principalagent relationship on banks' risk taking behavior in order to illustrate the emergence of principal-agent problems within the different ownership structures.
If bank owners have the ability to control bank managers sufficiently, we do not expect that the bank managers deviate from the optimal investment portfolio. Thus, principal-agent problems do not seem likely. Accordingly, Table 1 displays our estimations of the monitoring capabilities within the distinguishable banking categories.
We tend to characterize Landesbanken by low abilities of owners to control bank managers because the politicians who are conducting governance issues instead of the factual owners ('citizens') are typically uninformed about the banking business. Local politicians mandated by the citizens to monitor savings banks are also constrained by missing knowledge about the banking business.
In case of dispersed shareholders, we traditionally assume that shareholders have no control incentives because they have to share the benefits of monitoring to all other shareholders. Thus, regarding monitoring capabilities we assume a high relevance of principal-agent problems for banks held by dispersed shareholders. By contrast, banks owned by only one individual (or 'family') are subject to high control incentives. The risk-taking behavior of banks affiliated with commercial banks (commercial banks) depends on their specific ownership structure. If one individual or family owns a commercial bank, we expect the owner to have a considerable incentive to control. If dispersed shareholders are owners of a commercial bank, we contrarily do not presume a sufficient monitoring by bank owners.
Hence, for commercial banks we suppose a medium relevance of principal-agent problems.
Taking into account federal state authority's banks with special business purposes owned by the federal states, we suppose that the governments and namely the ministries of finance are able to control the bank managers to a high degree. By contrast, members of cooperatives generally are not able to monitor the bank managers. Finally, we assess controlling abilities of banks affiliated with insurance companies or International bank holdings to be comparable to those of commercial banks. In the case of banks owned by federal state authorities (Landesbanken), we do not notice a chance of risk pooling by bank owners ('citizens'). By contrast, we presume that
Landesbanken engaged investment bankers that have incentives to seek unreasonably high risk. Thus, both the missing capability of risk pooling and the engagement of investment bankers correlate with a high relevance of principal-agent problems.
Owners of savings banks ('local communities') and cooperatives are also very restricted in risk pooling. In addition, savings banks and cooperatives typically do not engage investment bankers. Therefore, we expect low incentives to search for risky activities resulting in a low relevance of principal-agent problems.
By contrast, dispersed shareholders retain good opportunities to diversify their wealth in several firms. Therefore, they are behaving (nearly) risk neutral. Furthermore, banks owned by dispersed shareholders are able to engage investment bankers. Thus, in this case we presume a high relevance of principal-agent problems.
If an individual or family owns a bank, the capacity of risk dispersion usually is limited so that we do not expect a divergence between risk attitudes of bank owners and bank managers.
Private banks face also good job opportunities of engaged investment bankers that create excessive risk-taking incentives and causes a high relevance of principal-agent problems.
Commercial banks, banks affiliated with insurance companies and subsidiaries of
International bank holdings are owned either by private owners or by dispersed shareholders.
Hence, the relevance of principal-agent problems appears to be medium to high. Incentives of seeking higher returns may be excessive, when banks' operations ground on higher profit-orientated principal-agent relationships. In the case of federal state authorities (Landesbanken) we assume that the influence of the principal ('politicians') creates incentives to seek higher returns because of principals' expectation on financing public expenditures out of bank profits while savings banks owned by local communities as well as cooperatives do not seem to be influenced by such incentives. Banks owned by dispersed shareholders appear to be tied to capital market expectations on gaining high returns to a high degree. By contrast, banks with individual owners apparently do not obey this kind of expectation. Thus, dispersed shareholders fortify principal-agent problems while private owners may weaken this issue.
Finally, we suppose that commercial banks, banks affiliated with insurance companies and subsidiaries of International bank holdings relate to medium expectations on future returns. Table 4 summarizes the aggregated relevance of principal-agent problems emerging from the factors mentioned above while we assume that all these factors show an equal impact on the risk-taking attitudes of banks. Thus, we apparently find the highest relevance of principalagent problems in the case of federal state authorities (Landesbanken) and banks owned by dispersed shareholders while we predict a low relevance for local communities as well as private banks and medium-scale relevance in the case of other bank categories. Accordingly, Figure 2 shows the importance of the principal-agent problems graphically. We draw simplified curves of equal distances-to-default, for example DD 1 to DD 3 . Curves that are closer to the origin indicate higher distances-to-default. Consequently, we expect the highest distances-to-default for banks owned by an individual owner and the lowest ones for federal state authorities (Landesbanken).
Figure 2: This figure illustrates the distances-of-default of different ownership-structures
It seems reasonable to compare distinguishable categories of bank with credit institutions owned by federal state authorities', like Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau' (KfW Bankengruppe) that special purposes are centered exclusively on the financing of private firms. Hence, for these institutions aspects like risk-taking or capital market pressure are irrelevant. We additionally assume that the government uses appropriate instruments to control the behavior of such special-purpose banks. Therefore, we expect federal state authorities in the origin of figure 2.
Analysis and Results
The following section covers our descriptive statistics and regression models applied to enlighten the influence of ownership structures on risk-taking attitudes of banks with a focus on the subprime crisis of 2008.
First, Table 6 shows the 'capital asset ratio' (CAR) assigned to the different ownership categories throughout the observation period. We can ascertain that special purpose banks owned by federal authorities report the highest capital asset ratios. By contrast, Landesbanken display the lowest capital asset ratio, which may be due the fact that these banks are also controlled by federal authorities, but have adopted a completely different business model as described by Hüfner (2010) Table 7 reports 'return on assets' (ROA) of banks tied to the different ownership structures over the observation period. Within this context, it is remarkable that some Landesbanken that are reporting the lowest returns on assets have been among the crisis-ridden banks that the However, returns on assets are only a rough indicator on the risk appetite of banks. By contrast, the 'distance-to-default' (DD) or so-called 'z-score' that is described in detail in section 3 is a widely accepted and intuitive risk figure because it takes into account the volatility of returns on assets. Table 8 demonstrates that special purpose banks owned by federal authorities will apparently be the most risk averse banks with a distance-to-default of more than five times higher when compared with banks assigned to other ownership categories. We tend to explain this observation by the very special business purposes of such In addition, it is interesting to note that the distances-to-default of cooperatives are relatively low. We tend to explain this observation by relatively strong fluctuations of the returns on assets during the observation period. Contrarily, private banks, banks allied to cooperatives, and subsidiaries of insurance companies are reporting the highest distances-todefault due to the low volatility of return on assets of these banks throughout the examination period in question. Table 9 reports the 'total assets' over the observation period assigned to the different ownership structures. Column 4 shows that the banks owned by dispersed shareholders, savings banks, subsidiaries of commercial banks and Landesbanken hold the majority of total assets allocated to the German banking system. Accordingly, the listed values of total assets demonstrate the important role of savings banks and particularly Landesbanken within the German financial industry. Furthermore, Table 9 illustrates that in accordance with their total assets savings banks and cooperatives may be of key importance for the stability of the German banking system. In contrast, we are able to characterize private banks and affiliates of insurance companies by relatively low amounts of total assets from 2000 to 2009.
However, our results so far draw a relative rough picture of the relationship between market shares of German banking sectors and risk-taking attitudes of banks during the last decade. Thus, in the following sections, we will offer a deeper insight to the structure of the German banking systems by considering pro-cyclical changes of distances-to-default prior to, and during the financial crisis of 2007/2008 in more detail (Adrian and Shin [2010] or Schmielewski [2012] ). Because of substantial losses by German banks and capital asset ratios that are not sufficiently covering an unexpected volatility of return on assets, Table 10 Table 11 (see Schmielewski [2012] ). ,447,078,600 2004 11,712,522 41,045,003 3,000,000 4,146,435,500 2005 13,472,913 45,093,730 3,100,000 4,905,714,800 2006 24,165,231 101,704,532 3,200,000 9,278,780,200 2007 28,814,919 127,709,352 3,400,000 11,128,899,900 2008 31,255,892 141,117,481 3,500,000 12,004,791,600 2009 28,857,375 111,876,519 3,700,000 9,371,500,000 At this stage of our study, we have found evidence of the distinguishable risk-taking behavior Table 13 relates distances-to-default to the relevance of principal-agent problems. The independent variables (Table 12 ) of our regressions cover banks' market share ('market share'), a dummy variable to distinguish between exchange traded and non-exchange traded banks ('exchange traded'), and a factored variable reflecting the ownership structure ('principals') of banks.
12 Table 12: This Table illustrates Quite the opposite, banks monitored by dispersed shareholders generally appear to show a higher risk appetite than other banks since they obtain the lowest and statistically significant standard beta coefficients during the observation period. Although banks held by dispersed shareholders tend to increase their distances-to-default, they consistently enter the regressions with negative and statistically significant standard beta coefficients. This observation offers strong support for our hypothesis that those banks with dispersed and low concentrated shareholders are operating their business less risk averse than other German banking sectors due to the high relevance of principal-agent problems listed in Table 13 .
These high-risk taking attitudes are comparable to those of banks owned by commercial banks because they also enter our regressions with negative and statistically significant coefficients throughout the observation period. This coincides with our assumption of medium principal-agent problems of commercial banks reported in Table 13 .
In contrast, banks with a remarkable low risk appetite controlled by insurance companies and private banks appear to adjust their distances-to-default efficiently. This risk attitude relates to positive and statistically high significant coefficients over the observation period particularly in the case of banks allied to insurance companies. Thus, these results also provide strong support for our thesis that banks with low relevance of principal-agent problems are selecting their optimal portfolio efficiently as long as bank owners are carrying out considerable monitoring capabilities. Comparing private banks and subsidiaries of insurance companies demonstrate that standard beta coefficients of private banks are lower than those for banks held by insurance companies do. In summarizing, we can clarify that due to a low relevance of principal-agent problems private banks appear to be more risk averse than banks with differing ownership structures such as banks reporting dispersed shareholders or affiliates of commercial banks. To conclude this section, we are able to ascertain that ownership structures of banks display a statistically significant relationship with our considered measurement of distances-to-default.
Furthermore, the results confirm our assumptions on the relevancy of principal-agent problems to a high degree.
Conclusions
In a first stage, we rely on a theoretical model explaining that from the bank owners' viewpoint three factors of the principal-agent relationship are determining the probability of finding the optimal portfolio of risky assets such that are the ability to control bank managers, risk pooling by bank owners and bank managers, and incentives of seeking high returns.
Depending on the relevance of the emerging principal-agent problems, the ownership structure of a bank may mislead the bank manager's risk-taking behavior in such a way that she chooses an unreasonable position of risky assets that result in bank owner's disutility.
Moreover, it seems likely that the greater the profit pressure on bank managers exerted by bank owners to seek high returns the greater the probability that bank managers take excessive risky positions. Furthermore, it is intuitive that the lower the monitoring capabilities of bank owners the greater the probability of failures in choosing the optimal portfolio of risky assets from the bank owners' viewpoint. These assumptions are of major interest to the bank owners since the marginal increase of return is the lower the higher the level of risk as suggested by Markowitz (1952) .
In a second stage, by comparing different kinds of ownership structures within the German banking industry we offer empirical evidence that the risk-taking attitudes of bank managers are depending on the ability to control bank managers, the risk pooling by bank owners and bank managers, and the incentives of seeking high returns. In detail, we can underline the distinguishable risk-taking behavior of bank managers that are participating different principal-ownership-structures by measuring the according distances-to-default reported for the period from 2000 to 2010.
Finally, we tend to argue that our theoretical model as well as our empirical findings could explain the ambiguous results in recent literature. Particularly, our theoretical model may contribute to the current discussions with regulatory authorities on necessary changes of the supervisory framework: If 'private banks are the better banks' due to a lower emergence of principal-agent problems these banks might be regulated to a lower degree. By contrast, legislative and regulatory authorities should increase their vigilance in terms of principalagent problems within certain sectors of the banking industry demonstrating a high relevance of principal-agent problems.
